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J.L. 'S TIME BOMB STILL TICKING: HOW NAVARETTE'S 
NARROW HOLDING FAILED TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT 
ISSUES REGARDING ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Andrew B. Kartchner* 
The conflict is clear and the stakes are high. The effect of 
the rule below will be to grant drunk drivers one free 
swerve before they can legally be pulled over by police. It 
will be difficult for an officer to explain to the family of a 
motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a tip that 
the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they were 
powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check. I 
Five years ago, Chief Justice Roberts offered this emotionally 
charged rhetoric in dissent from the Supreme Court's refusal to 
review a Virginia case involving an anonymous tip of drunk: driving? 
The relatively new Chief Justice took issue with the Virginia 
Supreme Court's ruling that police must corroborate tips of drunk 
driving before initiating traffic stopS.3 Chief Justice Roberts, pointing 
out that the Court has "repeatedly emphasized" the danger of drunk 
driving, urged the Court to resolve this issue, which has "deeply 
divided" the courtS.4 Although stopping short of implying how he 
would decide the issue, the language in Chief Justice Roberts's 
dissent left little doubt that he would favor a rule allowing police to 
pull over motorists who had been reported to be driving drunk 
without corroborating the tip. 5 
* J.D., magna cum laude, Regent University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, Portland 
State University; Law Clerk to the Hon. James A. Teilborg, U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone. The 
author thanks his ever-supportive wife, Holly, for making his academic, intellectual, 
and professional endeavors possible. 
1. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 981 (2009), denying cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 
2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
2. Id. 
3. See id. 
4. Id. at 979. 
5. See id. at 981 ("[T]he police should have every legitimate tool at their disposal for 
getting drunk drivers off the road."). 
1 
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The controversy is rooted in the Court's apprehensive view toward 
anonymous tips as justification for investigatory stopS.6 Police need 
"reasonable suspicion" to make an investigative stop, often called a 
"Terry stop,,,7 and questions arise when police base their suspicion on 
tips from unidentified informants. 8 Identified informants' 
trustworthiness and basis of knowledge can easily be evaluated based 
on previous dealings with police, criminal records, or a number of 
other "indicia of reliability,,,9 but this information is not available for 
anonymous tipsters. \0 Additionally, anonymous tipsters, unlike 
identified informants, are not subject to arrest if they make a false 
complaint. I I Thus, the Court has historically required police to verify 
the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of anonymous tips 
before conducting an investigatory stop,12 typically by corroborating 
information in the tip with first-hand police observations. 13 
Requiring similar corroboration of tips reporting imminently 
dangerous activity such as drunk-driving would force police to wait 
until they observe dangerous behavior before they can do anything to 
stop it, "by which time it may be too late.,,14 
The Court put the issue into the limelight over a decade ago, when 
Justice Ginsburg explained in dicta, in Florida v. JL., an anonymous 
tips case involving a firearms violation: 
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about 
the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an 
anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even 
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for 
6. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,329 (1990) ("[A]n anonymous tip alone 
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as 
ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their 
everyday observations and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous 
tips is 'by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213,237 (1983))). 
7. The Court has allowed investigatory stops based on "reasonable suspicion" since its 
landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,30-31 (1968). 
8. E.g., White, 496 U.S. at 329. 
9. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). 
10. See White, 496 U.S. at 329 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237). 
11. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (1972); see a/so Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harris v. Virginia, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008). 
12. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; White, 496 U.S. at 328; Gates, 462 U.S. at 225, 246. 
13. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; see a/so White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 ("[W]hen the officers 
stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish 
reasonable suspicion .... "); Gates, 462 U.S. at 268 ("[P]robab1e cause may yet be 
established by independent police investigatory work that corroborates the tip .... "). 
14. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978,978 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), denying cert. 
to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need 
bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a 
person carrying a firearm before the police can 
constitutionally conduct a frisk. 15 
3 
Since JL., courts have analogized drunk driving to Justice 
Ginsburg's ticking time bomb hypothetical. I6 
In April 2014, the Court resolved the question of corroboration in 
Navarette v. California, a case out of California involving two 
brothers l7 who were pulled over by police pursuant to an anonymous 
tip.18 The information the tip reported was simple enough: five 
minutes earlier, a silver Ford F150 truck with license plate number 
8D94925 had run the tipster off the road at mile marker 88, heading 
south on Highway 1.19 Using the information from the tip, the police 
were quickly able to find the Navarettes driving a silver Ford F150 
with a matching plate number on Highway 1, about twenty miles 
from where the tipster had reported the reckless driving.20 But while 
the identifying information in the tip pointed the police straight to the 
Navarettes, the officers failed to observe any driving activity to 
15. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74. J.L. involved an anonymous call to the Miami-Dade police 
reporting "that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a 
plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id. at 268. With just that information, the police went 
to the bus stop, saw a black teenager in a plaid shirt, and conducted a stop-and-frisk 
which turned up a firearm. Id. It turned out the black teenager was "10 days shy of 
his 16th birthday," so his possession of the firearm as a minor was illegal under 
Florida law. Id. at 269. 
Some courts have held firearm infractions to be "a qualitatively different [i.e., lower] 
level of danger" than drunk driving. E.g., People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810,815 (Cal. 
2006); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000). 
16. E.g., Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 ("Indeed, a drunk driver is not at all unlike a 'bomb,' 
and a mobile one at that."); Wells, 136 P.3d at 815 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867). 
17. Mark Sherman, Court: Is Anonymous Tip Enough For Traffic Stop?, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.orglartic1e/court-anonymous-tip-
enough-traffic-stop. 
18. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 n.l (2014). Aside from the sufficiency 
of the anonymous tip to justify the stop, another issue in the case, which the Supreme 
Court did not review, is whether the officer fabricated the tip itself. People v. 
Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12,2012), 
aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). The tip in question was made by a driver in Humboldt 
County to that county's 911 call center. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686. The 911 
dispatcher from Humboldt County, apparently realizing that the suspect was heading 
to Mendocino County, then forwarded the tip to the Mendocino County 911 call 
center, which then relayed the tip to the police officers that initiated the stop. Id. 
19. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686-87. 
20. Id. at 1687. 
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corroborate the tip's assertion that the Navarettes were driving 
recklessly.21 
About a half hour after the tipster made the 911 call, the police had 
caught up to the Navarette brothers, pulled them over, and requested 
identification.22 During the conversation, the police officers smelled 
marijuana and consequently searched the truck. 23 The search 
uncovered four large bags of marijuana, fertilizer, hand clippers, and 
oven bags, which apparently led an expert at the suppression hearing 
to conclude that the Navarette brothers were looking to sell the 
drugs.24 Based on the evidence found in the search, the Navarettes 
were charged with several drug crimes.25 
Pre-trial, the Navarettes moved to suppress the fruits of the search, 
arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to make the 
traffic stop because the tip "did not provide enough information about 
the alleged illegal driving to render the tip reliable without 
corroboration of illegal activity by the officers.,,26 After the brothers' 
motion to suppress the evidence was denied and all interlocutory 
appeals failed, the brothers pled guilty to transportation of marijuana 
and appealed the entire case until it reached the Supreme Court of the 
United States.27 
The specific question before the Supreme Court in Navarette was: 
"Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an 
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate 
dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?,,28 Justice Thomas 
drafted a narrow opinion for the deeply divided COurt,29 avoiding 
some of the more pressing sub-questions that will likely continue to 
linger in the lower courtS.30 Justice Breyer joined the conservative 
21. Id.at1691. 
22. Id. at 1686-87. 
23. Id. 
24. Navarette, 2012 WL 4842651, at *2. 
25. Id. at * 1. 
26. Id. at *7. 
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 5-6, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) 
(No. 12-9490),2013 WL 5476824. 
28. Id. at *i; Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50, No. 12-9490,2013 WL 5430499 (U.S. 
Oct. 1,2013) (granting certiorari, limited to the first question in the request). 
29. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686, 1692. 
30. Most notably, Justice Thomas avoided the question posed by Justice Ginsburg in J.L. 
concerning whether the same quantum of suspicion is necessary when imminently 
dangerous activity is reported by an anonymous tipster. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 
273-74 (2000). 
2014 J.L. 's Time Bomb Still Ticking 5 
majority, trading places with Justice Scalia who wrote a 
characteristically aggressive and somewhat snarky dissent.3l 
Although the Navarette majority resolved the issue of 
corroboration, its narrowly crafted opinion left unanswered many 
questions associated with anonymous tips of drunk driving.32 To give 
lower courts the guidance they need, however, a more comprehensive 
approach is necessary. 
Some courts have understood the wider picture as they have 
analyzed anonymous tips.33 Perhaps the most specific and useful 
enunciation of a comprehensive approach to anonymous tips is found 
in a Virginia appellate court decision written by Judge D. Arthur 
Kelsey.34 In a 2003 opinion, Judge Kelsey identified three 
"commonsense principles" by which courts should analyze 
anonymous tips: "observational reliability," insider information, and 
public danger.35 This article uses Judge Kelsey's framework as a 
suggestion for a more comprehensive approach to anonymous tips, 
since the Court in Navarette only addressed one of these important 
principles. 
Part I of this Article explains what Judge Kelsey called 
"observational reliability," which was recognized· in Navarette's 
analogy to the Federal Rules of Evidence. A deeper look into the 
history of hearsay law reveals that the common law has already 
developed principles, now well established, that shed light on 
whether certain statements are reliable.36 These principles have been 
codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence as the exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay, which recognize that "under appropriate 
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness.'>37 It makes sense, then, to tum to 
hearsay law for help in determining what kind of "circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness" might be present in anonymous tips. 
Specifically, this Article examines the history, scholarship, and 
theory behind the Present Sense Impression exception to the rule 
31. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686, 1692-97. 
32. See id. at 1695-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33. The Eighth Circuit, for example, elaborated on a range of factors that courts ought to 
consider when weighing the reliability of an anonymous tip. United States v. Wheat, 
278 F.3d 722, 731-37 (8th Cir. 2001). 
34. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 210, 213-14 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on 
reh 'g en bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004). 
35. Id at 213-14. 
36. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. 
37. Id 
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against hearsay and how that exception is useful in the anonymous 
tips analysis. 
Part II of this Article argues something that the Court in Navarette 
completely overlooked: that corroboration is less useful when a tip 
reports openly observable activity than when it reports concealed 
crimes such as crimes of possession. When a tipster reports a crime 
that is not readily observable by the public-as was the case in all the 
anonymous tips cases the Supreme Court has decided-then 
corroboration is necessary to prove the tipster's personal 
knowledge.38 When, however, a report of observable activity is 
made, a tipster's personal knowledge is much less suspect.39 
Part III of this Article explores the most mystifying omission of the 
Navarette decision: the balancing analysis most state courts have 
conducted to weigh the imminent danger posed by drunk driving 
against the intrusion of the Terry stop. In other words, many state 
courts have held that the threat of imminent danger changes the 
quantum of suspicion necessary to make a traffic stop "reasonable" 
under the Fourth Amendment. 40 This is nothing new in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, for "exigent circumstances" have long 
38. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip that 
only provided general information about J.L. lacked sufficient reliability and 
corroboration by the police was insufficient because anyone in public could have 
provided the information; accordingly, the court held that the anonymous tip must 
provide predictive information about the alleged concealed criminal activity in order 
to allow sufficient police corroboration); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) 
(holding that the police corroboration of the details provided by the anonymous tip 
provided sufficient reliability to lawfully permit the officers investigatory stop of the 
vehicle because the tip contained specific, predictive information about the 
defendant's concealed criminal activity). 
39. See State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009) ("[A] report of readily 
observable evidence of reckless driving carries a higher degree of inherent reliability 
than does a report of a concealed weapon."); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 
1220 (Del. 2004) ("We agree that a tip about readily observable evidence of criminal 
activity, such as erratic driving, is inherently more reliable than a tip about concealed 
criminal activity. Because the basis of the tipster's knowledge is apparent where the 
criminal activity is readily observable to other motorists or pedestrians, its reliability 
is increased.") (footnote omitted). 
40. See People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he threat of 
imminent danger [posed by concealed weapons or contraband] is not necessarily as 
high as in the present case, in which an erratic driver threatened the lives of fellow 
drivers."); Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1221 ("[W]hen deciding whether an 
anonymous tip of erratic driving provided reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, 
courts should balance the government's interest in responding immediately to reports 
of unsafe driving against the comparatively modest intrusion on individual liberty that 
a traffic stop entails. An erratic driver poses a potentially imminent threat of harm to 
the public.") (footnote omitted). 
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been held to justify even the most intrusive of searches,41 and the 
Supreme Court has already relaxed Fourth Amendment principles 
when drunk driving is involved.42 Shockingly, the Court in Navarette 
avoided this discussion altogether. 
This Article concludes that by neglecting to address the issues 
associated with insider information and the dangers of drunk driving, 
the Court in Navarette missed an opportunity to effectively close the 
book on anonymous tips, leaving many questions unresolved. 
I. OBSERVATIONAL RELIABILITY 
Judge Kelsey's framework first explains that certain reports should 
be analyzed based on their content and the circumstances under 
which the reports were made.43 Judge Kelsey calls this an inquiry 
into "observational reliability" because it gives weight to the details 
of the report rather than the "personal reliability" of the tipster.44 
This commonsense principle flows from the obvious inability of 
police to validate the personal trustworthiness of an anonymous 
informant and a policy of encouraging "disinterested," "public-
spirited" citizens to quickly report crimes and other dangerous 
situations.45 While a paid informer or one who seeks immunity for 
his reports is inherently unreliable, and should be presumed as such, 
ordinary tipsters have no such discrediting characteristics and should 
not be treated with the same scrutiny merely because they decide to 
not leave their name with the police.46 Rather, an anonymous tip 
made during or shortly after the commission of a crime witnessed by 
41. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment does 
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would 
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others."); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 
1849, 1856 (2011) ("One well-recognized exception applies when 'the exigencies of 
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" (quoting Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
42. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
43. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 213 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g en 
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004). 
44. Id. at 213 (quoting State v. Wa1shire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001)). 
45. Id.; Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 187 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Va. 1972) ("Public-spirited 
citizens should be encouraged to furnish to the police information of crimes. 
Accordingly, we will not apply to citizen informers the same standard of reliability as 
is applicable when police act on tips from professional informers or those who seek 
immunity for themselves, whether such citizens are named or, as here, unnamed." 
(citing People v. Glaubman, 485 P.2d 711 (Colo. 1971))). 
46. Jackson, 576 S.E.2d at 213. 
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the tipster ought to be evaluated primarily by analyzing the details of 
the tip, not the personal characteristics of the tipster. 
The Court in Navarette recognized this, noting that 
contemporaneous eyewitness reports have "long been treated as 
especially reliable.,,47 Indeed, this is a principle with deep roots in 
the common law, and a number of other courts have relied on it to 
justify Terry stops conducted pursuant to anonymous tips.48 Given 
the Court's recent tendency to cite legal history in its constitutional 
opinions,49 it is unsurprising that Justice Thomas would invoke this 
deep history to support the holding that contemporaneous eyewitness 
reports are inherently reliable.50 Yet, given the brevity of the 
majority's discussion and the vigor of the dissent in Navarette, it is 
worthwhile to examine the roots of this concept. 
1. The Common Law: Res Gestae 
"[G]uarantees of trustworthiness. .. form the hallmark of all 
exceptions to the hearsay rule."sl And if "circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness"s2 can save a hearsay statement from its "intrinsic 
47. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014). 
48. United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722,734 (8th Cir. 2001) ("A careful reading of the 
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the 
predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to 
describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of 
erratic driving witnessed by another motorist."); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 
1212, 1220 (Del. 2004) ("Tips reporting erratic driving also may be more reliable 
because they usually will be made close in time to when the tipster observes the 
potential criminal activity.") (footnote omitted); People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56, 
62 (Mich. Ct. App. 20 II) ("[W]e must make clear that less information is required 
from citizen informants reporting contemporaneous incidents .... "); State v. Sousa, 
855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (finding that a relevant factor in determining 
"whether the tip is based upon contemporaneous eyewitness observations" is "whether 
an anonymous tip gives rise to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 
44, 51 (Tenn. 2009) ("[W]hen a tipster seeks to report the location of a reckless driver 
at the time the reckless driving is observed or shortly thereafter, the tipster has a very 
brief amount of time to contact the police, and the likelihood that the allegation is 
fabricated is proportionately diminished."). 
49. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592-95, 600-03, 606-11 (2008) 
(describing the history of the right to bear arms); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 
739-43 (2008) (recounting the "history and origins of the writ [of habeas corpus]"); 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (discussing the history of the 
Confrontation Clause); Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, The Resurgent Role of Legal History 
in Modern U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 37 VA. B. ASS'N. NEWS J. 10, 10-13 (2010). 
50. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
51. United States v. Mitchell, 145 FJd 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Miller v. 
Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
52. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. 
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weakness,,,53 then certainly some similar sets of circumstances can 
show the reliability of a similar type of statement, an anonymous tip. 
In other words, the rationale behind the hearsay exceptions sheds 
some light on the type of circumstances that make a normally 
unreliable statement sufficiently trustworthy. As Justice Thomas 
noted in Navarette, the history and rationale of the present sense 
impression exception is especially instructive when analyzing 
anonymous tips.54 
It is unclear when courts first began to recognize the present sense 
impression exception, but at least one example predates the 
Constitution by almost a century.55 In 1693, the English trial court in 
Thompson and Wife v. Trevanion admitted into evidence a statement 
made by an assaulted woman, reasoning that she made the statement 
"immediate[ly] upon the hurt received, and before that she had time 
to devise or contrive any thing [sic] for her own advantage. ,,56 
Thompson seems to be the first court opinion to articulate the 
rationale of the present-day present sense impression hearsay 
exception: contemporaneous eyewitness observations are reliable 
because they are made before the declarant has a chance to forget or 
change his story.57 
53. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295-96 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.). 
54. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
55. Thompson v. Trevanion, (1683) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 ~ 37 (K.B.). 
56. Jd. 
57. Id. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Thompson 
court seemed to be more concerned with conscious misrepresentations made after an 
event than inadvertent changes in memory. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory 
committee's notes ("The underlying theory of [the present sense impression] 
exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negat[e] the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.") (emphasis added). Courts 
and scholars, however, have recognized that the contemporaneity requirement 
negatives both deliberate and unconscious distortion of memory. Most notably, in 
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, what many call the "leading case" on present sense 
impressions, GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 210 
(1978); CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 298 n.69 (2d ed. E. Clearly 1972); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression 
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REv. 869, 
871 n.9 (1980) (citing RICHARD a .. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH 
TO EVIDENCE 400 n.94 (1977», a Texas appellate court quoted from an evidence 
treatise to explain the "safeguards" that spontaneous declarations have against 
unreliability; 
In the first place, the report at the moment of the thing then seen, 
heard, etc., is safe from any error from defect of memory of the 
declarant. Secondly, there is little or no time for calculated 
misstatement, and thirdly, the statement will usually be made to 
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English courts echoed the rule in Thompson for over a century, 58 
and it even made its way into a United States Supreme Court ruling 
almost two hundred years later. 59 But the present sense impression 
concept-and the hearsay rule itself-remained "unsettled at the tum 
of the eighteenth century.,,60 As the concept took shape, it eventually 
acquired the name: res gestae or, in the singular, res gesta.61 
For some time in England, res gestae evaded concrete definition.62 
Literally translated "things done,,,63 res gestae was a term used to 
describe all the central facts and circumstances surrounding the event 
or transaction in a case.64 Courts admitted the entire res gestae, 
including hearsay statements, based on several rationales.65 Some 
statements were admitted because they were an integral part of the 
event or transaction.66 Today, such declarations are generally 
considered statements of "legally operative fact" and outside the 
hearsay rule entirely.67 Other statements were admitted because they 
were "made at the same time with the thing which it imports" and 
another (the witness who reports it) who would have equal 
opportunities to observe and hence to check a misstatement. 
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) 
(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & ROY ROBERT RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 430 (1937)). 
58. See, e.g., Aveson v. Kinnaird, (1805) 102 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B.) 1261; 6 East. 188, 
193-94. 
59. Travellers' Ins. Co. of Chi. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. 397,407 (1869). 
60. Waltz, supra note 57, at 873. 
61. Id. at 871. The difference between the singular and plural forms is not insignificant, 
see id. at 873-74, but this Article, for simplicity's sake, will refer to it in its plural 
form. 
62. One scholar opined that the term "gained currency as much for its convenient 
obscurity as for any better or more readily discernible reason." Id. at 873. Another 
called it a "nebulous concept" until Edmond M. Morgan undertook to "make sense" of 
it. Dennis D. Prater & Virginia M. Klemme, Res Gestae Raises Its Ugly Head, J. 
KAN. B. ASS'N, Oct. 1996, at 24,25. 
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (7th ed. 1999). 
64. Id. (citing State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404,417 (Nev. 1950)). 
65. See Waltz, supra note 57, at 873-74. 
66. Id. at 873-74. 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. Beede, 
931 A.2d 1258, 1262 (N.H. 2007). The historical understanding of this type of res 
gestae comports with the modem understanding-legally operative words are not 
hearsay. Waltz, supra note 57, at 873-74 ("[W]here the declarant's words are 
themselves a part of the event or transaction in dispute, a part of the 'thing [singular] 
done,' the hearsay rule has no application.") (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
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thus were part of the res gestae because of their evidentiary value.68 
This second type of res gestae laid the foundation for the present 
sense impression hearsay exception.69 
Res gestae eventually made its way into American courts and "was 
used here in an extraordinary variety of situations to allow the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements and other evidence.,,7o After 
years of inconsistent usage, renowned American evidence scholar 
James Bradley Thayer undertook to clarify the meaning of res gestae 
and its usefulness as a rule of evidence, with his work culminating in 
a "brilliant,,71 three-part article on the topic.72 Thayer's research 
sprang from the controversy sparked by an 1880 English homicide 
case in which the judge excluded the statements of the victim, made 
shortly after her throat was slit, because "it was not part of anything 
done, or something said while something was being done, but 
something said after something done. ,>7) This ruling spawned 
controversy in the legal community and even prompted the trial judge 
to compose and publish a defense of his ruling, which Thayer 
addressed thoroughly. 74 Having given clarity to the nature of 
contemporaneous eyewitness reports, Thayer's work has been 
described as the "first careful definition of the [present sense 
impression] exception by an American. ,,75 
It was Thayer who first articulated the two types of res gestae used 
by the COurtS.76 According to Thayer, the principle behind the second 
type of res gestae-the type that birthed the present sense impression 
exception-"has always existed.'>77 The reasoning behind admitting 
68. James B. Thayer, Bedingfields's Case. -Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta. (pt. 
3), 15 AM. L. REV. 71, 82 (\881) [hereinafter Thayer III]. 
69. Waltz, supra note 57, at 874. 
70. Prater & Klemme, supra note 62, at 25. 
71. Waltz, supra note 57, at 871. 
72. James Bradley Thayer, Bedingfield's Case.-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta. 
(pt. I), 14 AM. L. REv. 817 (\880) [hereinafter Thayer I]; James Bradley Thayer, 
Bedingfield's Case.-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta. (pt. 2), 15 AM. L. REV. 
I (1881) [hereinafter Thayer II]; Thayer III, supra note 68. 
73. Waltz, supra note 57, at 871 (citing Thayer I, supra note 72, at 818). Apparently the 
case was not officially reported. Id. at 871 n.17. 
74. See, e.g., Thayer I, supra note 72, at 818-19 (discussing the facts and ruling of the 
Bedingfield trial); Thayer II, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that neither Chief Justice 
Cockburn or Mr. Tayler had discussed the historical origins of res gesta); Thayer III, 
supra note 68, at 91 (discussing the use of Chief Justice Cockburn's 
contemporaneousness requirement). 
75. Waltz, supra note 57, at 871. 
76. Id. at 876. 
77. Thayer III, supra note 68, at 82. 
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this type of res gestae is that it "takes notice of one of these strong 
elements of authenticity, contemporaneousness.,,78 
Thayer's work was followed-up by his student, Edmund Morgan, 
who, over forty years later, "attempted, in a law review article which 
matched his mentor's in perceptivity, to revive the Thayer 
formulation of the present sense impression exception.,,79 When the 
American legal profession was drafting the model rules of evidence 
in the mid-1900s, Morgan became known as the "leading advocate of 
the [present sense impression] exception. ,,80 When the Federal Rules 
of Evidence were unveiled, Morgan was credited by the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules for outlining the elements and "underlying 
theory" of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).81 
2. Res Gestae in its Modern Form: FRE 803(1) - The Present Sense 
Impression 
After centuries of ,confusing and inconsistent precedent, the 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence gleaned a 
handful of important principles from the common law concept of res 
gestae, many of which are contained in Rule 803, entitled 
"Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-Regardless of Whether 
the Declarant is Available as a Witness.,,82 Section 803 is especially 
helpful when considering the reliability of anonymous tips, as those 
exceptions flow from the theory that "under appropriate 
circumstances a ... statement may possess circumstantial guarantee~ 
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the 
declarant. ,,83 
Of the 803 exceptions, the "present sense impression" exception in 
Rule 803(1) is probably the most instructive-it being based largely 
on the principle that contemporaneous observations are more reliable 
78. Id. at 83, 
79. Waltz, supra note 57, at 875 (citing Edward M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of 
Utterance Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE LJ. 229, 236-37 & n.l9 (1922)). 
80. M,e. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REv, 224,249 
(1961), 
81. FED, R, EVID, 803 advisory committee's note ("The underlying theory of exception 
[paragraph] (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negat[e] the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation,") (citing EDMUND MORGAN, 
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 340-41 (1962)). 
82. FED. R. EVID. 803; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (9th ed, 2009) ("In 
evidence law, words and statements about the res gestae are [usually] admissible 
under a hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited utterance), 
Where the Federal Rules of Evidence or state rules fashioned after them are in effect, 
the use of res gestae is now out of place."), 
83, FED, R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note, 
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than past observations.84 Rule 803(1) was boiled down from over a 
century of res gestae precedent to a few lines: 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, 
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or 
explaining ail event or condition, made while or 
immediately after the declarant perceived it. 85 
Thus, on its face, Rule 803(1) recognizes the value of statements 
that describe events when those statements are made 
contemporaneously with the event (or shortly thereafter) and with 
personal knowledge of the event.86 
The Advisory Committee Notes on FRE 803(1) explain that "[t]he 
underlying theory of [the present sense impression] exception is that 
substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. ,,87 This is so 
because as time passes, the likelihood increases that a witness of an 
event will fabricate a new story or the witness's memory will be 
distorted. 88 Other commentary on the rule indicates that the elements 
of the present sense impression exception are designed "[t]o assure 
trustworthiness," and that the contemporaneity of the statement is 
"perhaps [the] most significant[]" factor in determining whether a 
statement is reliable.89 As such, the present sense impression hearsay 
exception is a great illustration of why contemporaneous reports are 
presumptively reliable.90 
Of course, not all contemporaneous eyewitness reports are 
sufficiently reliable. Notably, the Advisory Committee Notes on 
FRE 803 express apprehension toward anonymous declarants: "when 
[a] declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy 
84. See id. 
85. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
86. See id. 
87. Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee's note. 
88. 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.1 (4th ed. 1996) 
("[T]he underlying rationale of the· present sense impression is that substantial 
contemporaneity ... minimizes unreliability due to [the declarant's] defective 
recollection or conscious fabrication."); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 
(8th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 57. 
89. John A. Bourdeau, When is Hearsay Statement "Present Sense Impression" 
Admissible Under Rule 803(1) of Federal Rules of EVidence, 165 A.L.R. FED. 491, 
504 (2000). 
90. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. 
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in upholding the statement alone as sufficient.,,91 It is important to 
note, however, that this hesitancy does not arise from any inherent 
unreliability of anonymous statements, but from the fact that 
contemporaneity and personal knowledge are difficult to prove (or 
disprove) when the declarant is not available for questioning.92 Thus, 
the Advisory Committee acknowledged that upholding anonymous 
statements under rule 803 "would under appropriate circumstances be 
consistent with the rule.,,93 While the Committee Notes do not 
divulge what those circumstances might be, the cases indicate that 
when the declarant is unidentified, contemporaneity and personal 
knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence94 such as the 
statement's language,95 timing,96 or consistency with other evidence 
presented.97 
In sum, the present sense impression hearsay exception in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, born from centuries of development in the 
91. Id. (citing Garrett v. Howden, 387 P.2d 874, 877 (N.M. 1963); Beck v. Dye, 92 P.2d 
1113, 1117 (Wash. 1939)). 
92. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507,510 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We do not conclude, however, 
that statements by unidentified declarants are ipso facto inadmissible under 
Fed.R.Evid. 803(2)."); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 706 
(S.D. Ga. 1993) ("Because the declarant who made this call is unidentified and is 
unavailable to testify, this issue presents a difficult matter to the Court."); Ramrattan 
v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D. Md. 1987) ("Here, the bystanders are 
unidentified, and their capacities to observe can neither be substantiated nor 
attacked."). 
93. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. 
94. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Because of the nature of 
the call and conversation, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting the 
tape-recording under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1), present sense impression, and 
803(2), excited utterance."). 
95. Keating, 754 F.2d at 511 ("In some cases, however, the substance of the statement 
itself does contain words revealing perception. A statement such as, 'I saw that blue 
truck run down the lady on the comer,' might stand alone to show perception if the 
trial judge finds, from the particular circumstances, that he is satisfied by a 
preponderance that the declarant spoke from personal perception."); Crown 
Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 706 ("The caller specifically stated, '[W]e noticed 
[the truck sideswipe a person],' thus indicating actual perception of the accident.") 
(alteration in original). 
96. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 706 ("[T]he timing of the declarant's call, 
which was received approximately 2 minutes after the call placed by Carper, who was 
at the scene of the accident, strongly suggests that the declarant observed the 
accident."). 
97. Compare Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
declarant had no personal knowledge of the event described because "no other 
evidence in the case was compatible with the [declarant's] report"), with Ramrattan, 
656 F. Supp. at 528 ("[T]his Court infers that if three [declarants] chose to tell 
[someone] what had happened, then it is likely they saw the accident."). 
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courts and followed by decades of meticulous scholarship, gives 
courts a well-established framework by which to determine whether 
an anonymous tip is reliable enough to constitute reasonable 
suspicion. Despite considerable debate as to what constitutes the res 
gestae of a case, one thing has been almost unanimously agreed upon 
by all courts and scholars: contemporaneity of a statement with the 
event described and personal knowledge of the event are significant 
indications of the trustworthiness of the report. 98 Thus, despite 
Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent,99 the majority in Navarette was 
correct to rely on the rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) to 
show the reliability of an anonymous tip. 
II. INSIDE INFORMATION 
The second factor in Judge Kelsey's framework involves the 
amount of inside information a tipster must demonstrate before police 
may properly rely on the tip to justify a stop.lOO This, Judge Kelsey 
explained, depends on whether the informant reported a "concealed 
98. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 ("[W]e generally credit the 
proposition that statements about an event and made soon after perceiving that event 
are especially trustworthy .... "); id. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The classic 
'present sense impression' is the recounting of an event that is occurring before the 
declarant's eyes, as the declarant is speaking .... It is the immediacy that gives the 
statement some credibility; the declarant has not had time to dissemble or 
embellish."). 
99. Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's reliance on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
is a bit overblown. He claims that because the tipster was able to stop the car, record 
the Navarettes' license plate number, and dial 911, the tip cannot be considered 
contemporaneous. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But the 
Advisory Committee notes make it clear that the present sense impression exception 
"recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not 
possible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable." FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory 
committee's notes. It seems odd that Justice Scalia would argue that the few seconds 
it takes to stop a car (which had already been ran to the side of the road), observe a 
license plate, and call 911 would constitute more than a "slight lapse." 
Justice Scalia also argues that FRE 803(1) is not very helpful because, "cases 
addressing an unidentified declarant's present sense impression 'indicate hesitancy in 
upholding the statement alone as sufficient' proof of the reported event." Navarette, 
134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This argument is also unpersuasive. The 
question in hearsay objections is whether the statement is reliable enough to be 
admitted into evidence, not whether the statement alone is sufficient to prove the fact 
asserted. The former is a much lower standard, and therefore much more analogous to 
the reasonable suspicion standard. 
100. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 211-12 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh 'g en 
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004). 
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crime or an open and obvious crime.,,101 The idea is that one does not 
usually know the details of a concealed crime, such as drug 
trafficking, unless he has "inside information."lo2 Thus, reports of 
concealed crimes, without indications that the tipster has inside 
information, are less reliable than an eyewitness report of an open 
crime. 103 Notably, the tips in Gates, White, and J.L. all reported 
concealed crimes, putting the tipster's basis of knowledge in 
question. 104 
This distinction between concealed and open crimes has been lost 
on many courts when ruling on anonymous tips, including the 
Navarette COurt. I05 The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the 
facts of Navarette from those in J.L., but neglected one important 
detail: the tipster in J.L. reported a concealed crime (illegal 
possession),106 while the tipster in Navarette reported an open crime 
(reckless or impaired driving). 107 Another notable example is 
provided by the Virginia Supreme Court in Jackson, which 
overturned Judge Kelsey's instructive opinion with very little 
attention to his analysis. 108 The Virginia Supreme Court insisted that 
"[r]arely are the facts of two cases as congruent as the facts in J.L. 
and this case,,,109 despite the fact that the tip in J.L. reported that the 
defendant possessed a gun (a concealed crime)IIO while the tip in 
Jackson reported that the defendant brandished a gun (an open 
crime). I II 
The Court in Navarette missed an opportunity to highlight the 
importance of the concealed-open crime distinction. Indeed, by 
recognizing that anonymous tips reporting open crimes are less 
suspect than tips reporting concealed crimes, the Court in Navarette 
might not have concluded that it was a "close case.,,112 
10 1. Id. at 213. 
102. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,332 (1990). 
103. Jackson, 576 S.E.2d at 213. 
104. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); White, 496 U.S. at 327; Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 225 (1983). 
105. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683,1689 (2014). 
106. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. -
107. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686. 
108. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 601--{)3 (Va. 2004). 
109. Id. at 601 (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 583 S.E.2d 780, 795 (Va. Ct. App. 
2003) (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 
595 (Va. 2004)). 
110. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
111. Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 597. 
112. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 332 (1990)). 
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III. PUBLIC DANGER 
Judge Kelsey's final factor to consider when analyzing anonymous 
tips is the "seriousness of the danger posed by the alleged 
illegality."ll3 When a tip reports activity that presents imminent 
danger to the public, the amount of corroboration necessary 1,0 
constitute reasonable suspicion ought to be diminished. The 
fundamental justification for this principle lies in the text of the 
Constitution itself; the Fourth Amendment proscribes only 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 114 Reasonableness is, of course, 
a fluid concept, but it seems clear that searches and seizures are more 
reasonable when conducted to prevent an imminent threat to the 
public. liS Relatedly, searches and seizures are more reasonable when 
they are limited in scope so as to minimize invasion of privacy. 116 In 
short, to investigate imminently dangerous activity such as drunk 
driving, police may act on less evidence, so long as the investigation 
is limited in scope. 117 
In fact, the Supreme Court has already applied this type of 
balancing test in another case involving drunk driving, I 18 In 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court 
upheld a sobriety checkpoint program because "the balance of the 
State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this 
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree 
of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, 
weighs in favor of the state program.,,1l9 Central to the Court's 
holding was the "magnitude of the drunken driving problem" and the 
113. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 214 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g en 
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004). 
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Andrew B. Kartchner, Virginia in the Driver's Seat: How the 
Supreme Court of Virginia Can Help the Supreme Court of the United States Finally 
Establish the Drunk-Driving Exception to Anonymous Tips Law, 25 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 185, 206 (2013) ("[T]he Founders intentionally infused a balancing test into the 
Fourth Amendment by prohibiting only unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
115. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("[An] emergency or dangerous 
situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' ... would justify a 
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search."). 
116. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862,868 (Vt. 2000). 
117. People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("As noted, such 
investigative stops of automobiles have been deemed reasonable on the basis of less 
information because the public's interest in safety of the roadways is high compared 
to the minimally invasive nature of the investigation."). 
118. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990). 
119. Id.at455. 
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"slight[ ness]" of the inconvenience imposed by the checkpoints. l2O 
Notably, ten years later the Court struck down checkpoints where 
there was no imminent threat to the public, reasoning that without an 
imminent danger the normal reasonable suspicion standards cannot 
be altered. 121 
Courts that have upheld stops of drunk drivers based on anonymous 
tips have almost always included some sort of balancing test, 
weighing the danger posed by drunk drivers against the intrusion of a 
stop. 122 And courts that have struck down traffic stops based on tips 
of drunk driving have largely ignored the impact that the threat of 
imminent danger has on reasonable suspicion analysis,123 leading to 
Chief Justice Roberts's grave concerns over the tenability of such an 
approach. 124 
Unfortunately, in an effort to avoid thorny issues in favor of a 
narrow holding, the Court in Navarette ignored the question of 
whether tips of drunk driving require a lesser quantum of suspicion to 
justify a stop. Thus, the Navarette opinion will be of little help to the 
lower courts that will undoubtedly continue to face arguments by 
prosecutors that short traffic stops are justified by the serious threat 
implicated by drunk driving. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Justice Scalia was unpersuaded by the Navarette 
majority's recognition that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are 
inherently reliable,125 this principle is time-tested and widely 
120. Id. at 451. 
121. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (striking down 
checkpoints for drug trafficking). 
122. E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e think that 
there is a substantial government interest in effecting a stop as quickly as possible. 
That interest must be balanced against the individual's right to remain free from 
unreasonable government intrusion.") (footnote omitted); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 
862, 868 (Vt. 2000) ("Balancing the public's interest in safety against the relatively 
minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, the scale of justice in this 
case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other 
prudent course.") (citation omitted). 
123. E.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 150 n.3 (Va. 2008) (Kinser, l., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the prosecution's argument "that 
anonymous tips about incidents of drunk driving require less corroboration than tips 
concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public"); McChesney v. 
State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074-78 (Wyo. 1999). 
124. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009) (Roberts, C.l., dissenting). 
125. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 -97 (2014) (Scalia, l., dissenting). 
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accepted. l26 Still, in its attempt to craft a narrow opinion, the Court 
missed an opportunity to give lower courts some much needed 
guidance when it neglected to hold that (1) reports of openly 
observable crimes are more reliable than tips of concealed crimes, 
and (2) police need a lesser quantum of suspicion to justify stops 
when acting pursuant to tips of dangerous activity such as drunk 
driving. 
The Court's failure to address the level of suspicion necessary to 
stop reportedly drunk drivers is particularly strange because it leaves 
unanswered JL. 's hypothetical question: "[whether] the 
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip 
might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of 
reliability."l27 Indeed, much of the scholarship and commentary has 
centered on "whether anonymous tips about reckless or drunken 
driving should be treated differentiy."l28 And courts that have 
considered the issue have held that the level of danger implicated by 
an anonymous tip should at least be a factor of the analysis. l29 
Judging by the number of times he mentioned it at oral argument, it 
seemed the Navarettes' appellate counsel was also convinced that this 
important sub-issue would be decided by the Court.l30 But the Court 
in Navarette ignored the issue completely. 
Importantly, recognizing the factors mentioned by this Article 
would not render all anonymous tips of drunk driving reliable, so the 
potential for fraud by tipsters and police officersl3l under this 
126. See id. at 1689 (majority opinion). 
127. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,273 (2000). 
128. E.g., Cas sandre Plantin, Navarette v. California: Corroborating Anonymous Tips in 
Regards to Drunk Driving, CRIM. LAW PRACTITIONER (July 29, 2014), 
http://wclcriminallawbrief.blogspot.coml20 14/07 /supreme-court-watch-case-
update.html ("[Navarette] turns on whether there should be a 'drunk or reckless driver 
exception' to the corroboration requirement of anonymous tips."); Mark Sherman, 
Supreme Court to Rule Whether an Anonymous Tip is Enough for a Traffic Stop, 
HUFFINGTON POST (October I, 2013, 11 :23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml 
2013/1 % l/supreme-court-traffic-stop _ n _402345 8.html. 
129. See cases cited supra note 122. 
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 
(2014) (No. 12-9490),2014 WL 234212 at *20. 
131. Justice Stevens expressed similar concerns in Alabama v. White: 
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make 
her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will 
certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one 
predicting Vanessa White's excursion. In addition, under the 
Court's holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and 
questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the 
20 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
approach would be limited. For example, a tip from a motorist who 
observes a reckless driver but does not notify police until he or she 
returns home from a long drive would need more corroboration than 
the tip in Navarette, since the report would not be contemporaneous 
with the crime itself Similarly, a tip from a conscientious college 
student who noticed that his drunken friend's car was no longer 
outside the fraternity would not justify a stop of the car if found, 
since the tipster would lack personal knowledge. In other words, a 
comprehensive view of anonymous tips does not create an exception 
to the notmal rules; it simply allows courts to recognize that 
corroboration is not the only form of tip validation and to consider the 
totality of the circumstances in determining whether an officer had 
reasonable suspicion. 132 
By recognizing that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are 
reliable, the Court took one step toward closing the book on 
anonymous tips jurisprudence. But by neglecting other 
considerations, such as the concealed-open crime distinction and the 
dangerous nature of drunk driving, the Court has left many questions 
unanswered. The time bomb mentioned in JL. is still ticking. 
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting 
whatever conduct the officer just observed. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
132. The biggest test of the value of this approach in balancing the need to safeguard the 
public from danger against citizens' right to privacy would be a tip of a concealed, 
dangerous crime not contemporaneously observed by the tipster. For example, a tip 
reporting that someone is carrying a bomb in the trunk of a car would lack the 
inherent. reliability of a contemporaneous eyewitness report and would require proof 
of insider information because of the concealed nature of the activity. Such a tip 
would force the Court to decide whether danger alone can overcome the requirement 
that anonymous tips be verified. 
